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Childs and Stewart: Police: Additional Protection Through "Stop and Frisk"

CASE COMMENTS
POLICE: ADDITIONAL PROTECTION THROUGH
"STOP AND FRISK"
Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)
While on patrol, a police officer noticed two men who "didn't look right,"
and who were walking back and forth in front of a store peering in the
window. After this behavior had been repeated several times, the officer
suspected that the men were preparing for a robbery. He approached them,
identified himself, and, fearing they might be armed, patted down their
outer clothing and discovered two pistols. The trial court denied the motion
to suppress the evidence of the pistols. Following the Ohio supreme court's
denial of an appeal, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
HELD, that a carefully limited search of a suspect's outer clothing is permissible under certain conditions. The requisite conditions for the limited
search for weapons are: (1) unusual conduct indicating the possibility of
criminal activity, (2) reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and
presently dangerous, and (8) identification of the officer to the suspects.
Such a search is valid under the fourth amendment, and any weapons seized
may be properly introduced into evidence. Justices Black, Harlan, and
White concurring separately; Justice Douglas dissenting.
This is the first decision by the United States Supreme Court on the
constitutionality of the police procedure known as "stop and frisk," which
involves patting down a suspect's outer clothing. There is ample support
for the Court's holding. Common law recognized the power of police to
question, search, and detain persons found abroad at night.1 By statute, three2
states allow an officer to search a suspect reasonably believed to be armed.
In addition, some state and federal courts have upheld the frisk as both
reasonable and necessary for crime prevention even in the absence of a statute
allowing it.3 The Uniform Arrest Act, if adopted, would allow a frisk when
*Editor's Note: This Case Comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
most outstanding Case Comment submitted in the summer quarter 1968.
1. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14, 128 Eng. Rep. 6 (C.P. 1810); 2 M. HALE,
PLEAS OF THE CRowN 89, 97 (American ed. 1847); 2 W. HAWKINs, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 122,
129 (6th ed. 1787), quoted in Note, The Power To Stop and Frisk, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 119,
120 nn.3, 4 (1965). This same power has been recognized in several cases in the United
States: see Ellis v. United States, 264 F.2d 872, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 US.
998 (1959); People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 450, 380 P.2d 658, 660, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 30
(1963) (dictum); People v. Salerno, 38 Misc. 2d 467, 472, 235 N.Y.S.2d 879, 886 (Sup. Ct.
1962).
2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, §1903 (1953); N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §594.3 (1955); R. I. GE.
LAws ANN. §12-7-2 (1956). See also N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. CODE §180 (a) (Supp. 1966).
3. See, e.g., Keiningham v. United States, 307 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 948 (1963); Busby v. United States, 296 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 876 (1962); Ellis v. United States, 264 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
998 (1959); People v. Reed, 202 Cal. App. 2d 575, 20 Cal. Rptr. 911, 913 (1962).
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the officer reasonably believes himself to be in danger even though no arrest
is made. 4 There are indications that this procedure has become standard for
police dealing with a suspect who may be armed.5
Evolution of the law pertaining to searches has been shaped by the fourth
amendment's proscription against "unreasonable searches and seizures . . ."
and mandate that "no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause ....
The
inclusion of the fourth amendment in the Bill of Rights reflected the aversion
to the oppressive writs of assistance and general warrants used indiscriminately during the colonial period.6 This distaste resulted in the general rule
that searches be supported by a search warrant on probable cause by a judicial
officer.7 As the memory of the colonial period faded, practical considerations
militated for relaxation of the requirement. Three exceptions to the general
rule have been recognized: searches incident to a valid arrest;8 searches of
vehicles if the officer has probable cause to believe that its contents offends
against the law;9 and consensual searches where constitutional protection
is waived.' 0
Because of the similarity of section 22 of the Declaration of Rights of the
Florida constitution to the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, Florida courts have accepted holdings by the United States Supreme
Court on what constitutes a valid search." Though a "stop and frisk" is
held permissible under the fourth amendment in the present decision, more
restrictive state laws may deny police its full benefit. Florida, for instance,
has applied a strict standard in determining the validity of a weapons search.
12
Typical of the Florida position is the decision in Roberson v. Florida.
In that case, the Florida supreme court ruled that under the Florida constitution a weapons search of a person proceeding peaceably was invalid, even
though the officer had been told this person was armed.
To the general rule requiring that searches be supported by a search
warrant issued by a judicial officer upon a showing of probable cause 3
Florida has also recognized certain exceptions, including: searches incident
to a valid arrest; 14 searches of vehicles where there is probable cause that its

4. See Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 325 (1942).
5. See LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police, 1962 WsH. U.L.Q. 331, 336;
Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, and Frisking of Suspected
Persons and Police Privileges in General, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 386, 391 (1960).
6. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and
the Law of Arrest, 54 J. GRIM. L.C. & P.S. 393, 396-97 (1963).
7. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958). See generally 50 CORNELL L.Q. 529 (1956).
8. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
9. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132

(1925).
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).
Leveson v. Florida, 138 So. 2d 361 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
43 Fla. 156, 29 So. 535 (1901).
FLA. CoNsr. Decl. of Rights §22.
Herring v. Florida, 121 So. 2d 807 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
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contents are illegal;' 5 and consensual searches.1 6 In Cameron v. Florida7 the
Florida supreme court stated in dictum that "in order to meet the changing
needs of society" the concept of immunity was to be lessened when automobiles
were involved by not requiring probable cause. Continued interest in adapting the law to the "need of society" may persuade the Florida supreme court
to authorize the "stop and frisk" held valid in the present case.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court recognized "stop and frisk" as
a fourth exception to the general probable cause rule. Since the exception
is described as a lesser form of restraint than an arrest,' 8 probable cause is
not a requisite. The influence of this notion, however, is very much in
evidence.' 9 The court hastened to mention that the procedure still involves
a search and seizure, thereby activating the fourth amendment's requirement
of reasonableness. 20 In determining reasonableness, the Court balanced "the
need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure]
entails." 2 ' On the one hand, there is the need for police to pursue their
legitimate investigative function. For example, a policeman observing suspicious behavior must investigate to prevent the commission of a crime.
Protection for the officer is a necessary corollary to performing his duty, and
this cannot be satisfactorily discharged when is he faced with the possibility
that a bullet may be the answer to his questions. On the other hand, there is
the individual's interest in freedom from official intrusion. The Court resolved the conflicting interests in favor of the policeman's safety.
To minimize invasion of individual privacy, a two-fold standard is
enunciated by the Court. First, the policeman must have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.22 Secondly, the officer must be able to
point out specific and articulable facts that justify belief that the person
being investigated is armed and dangerous. 23 The Court emphasizes that the
scope of this decision is limited to providing protection for the police officer. 24
Although this decision increases the policeman's protection, it also creates
evidentiary problems heretofore not encountered under the fourth amendment.
15.

Cameron v. Florida, 112 So. 2d 864 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1959); FLA.

STAT.

§933.19

(1967).
16. Troupe v. Florida, 130 So. 2d 91 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1961).
17. 112 So. 2d 864 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1959).
18. 88 S. Ct. at 1882.
19. A comparison of the language used to descrbe the degree of belief of guilt necessary
to establish probable cause in arrest cases, Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959);
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160

(1949), with the language used in the present case to determine the degree of belief required to justify a "stop and frisk," reveals that they are almost identical. The officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts that would have warranted a
reasonably prudent man in taking that action. 88 S. Ct. at 1883.
20. 88 S. Ct. at 1879.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1884.
23. Id.
24. Id. The Court makes it clear that its decision does not extend to the constitutional
propriety of an investigative seizure on less than probable cause for purposes of detention
and interrogation. 88 S. Ct. at 1879.
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The Court expressly held that any weapons seized through a valid "stop
and frisk" are admissible in evidence, 25 but the admissibility of other contraband under this rule is unclear at present. A logical extension of the holding
is that finding a weapon supports an arrest and expanded search incident
thereto. Any evidence obtained from this expanded search should then be
admissible under traditional evidentiary principles. 26 Problematical though
is the situation concerning a valid, protective frisk that uncovers no weapons
but reveals other incriminating evidence. The admissibility of such evidence
may be indicated by Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in a companion
case, Sibron v. New York: "Although the frisk is constitutionally permitted
only in order to protect the officer, if it is lawful the State is of course entitled
to the use of any other contraband that appears. 27
This approach compromises the Court's position that the sole justification
for the "stop and frisk" is physical protection of the police officer.28 The
Court might find itself allowing indirectly what it has heretofore held unconstitutional directly- a full search based on less than probable cause. The
potential for this result is revealed by the very nature of the facts and circumstances surrounding a stop and frisk situation. Heavy reliance must be
placed on the officer's testimony. To refute his testimony that the contraband
felt during a lawful frisk was believed to be a weapon would be difficult. Once
law enforcement officers learn what types of facts establish the reasonable
belief required, the courts will have difficulty determining whether the "stop
and frisk" was prompted by a reasonable belief that the defendant was armed
or by the desire to make an exploratory or harrassing search. 29 Abuses of
the "stop and frisk" privilege could become prevalent if local law enforcement officers yield to the temptation of constructing a convincing story to
gain admission for any evidence found on the suspect.
In looking for a solution, the Court might consider making the discovery
of a weapon the condition precedent to admitting any evidence derived from
a stop and frisk. This approach would minimize unwarranted invasions of
the individual by removing the major temptation for conducting unreasonable searches of suspects. The policeman could still perform his crime prevention duties in relative safety, and the stop and frisk would be limited to
satisfying the interest that justified its recognition - the physical safety of
the police officer.
MATrHEW CHILDS
WILLIAM STEWART

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 1885.
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
88 S. Ct. 1889, 1910 (1968) (concurring opinion).
88 S. Ct. at 1884.
Cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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